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She characterized this difference as one of theme, however, rather than of gender. Jake sees the Heinz dilemma as a math problem with people wherein the right to life trumps the right to property, such that all people would reasonably judge that Heinz ought to steal the drug. Amy, on the other hand, disagrees that Heinz should steal the drug, lest he should go to prison and leave his wife in another predicament.

She sees the dilemma as a narrative of relations over time, involving fractured relationships that must be mended through communication. Understanding the world as populated with networks of relationships rather than people standing alone, Amy is confident that the druggist would be willing to work with Heinz once the situation was explained. Gilligan posited that men and women often speak different languages that they think are the same, and she sought to correct the tendency to take the male perspective as the prototype for humanity in moral reasoning.

Later, Gilligan vigorously resisted readings of her work that posit care ethics as relating to gender more than theme, and even established the harmony of care and justice ethics , but she never fully abandoned her thesis of an association between women and relational ethics. Gilligan also expanded her ideas in a number of articles and reports Gilligan, ; ; ; In Noddings published Caring , in which she developed the idea of care as a feminine ethic, and applied it to the practice of moral education.

Drawing conceptually from a maternal perspective, Noddings understood caring relationships to be basic to human existence and consciousness. Noddings located the origin of ethical action in two motives, the human affective response that is a natural caring sentiment, and the memory of being cared-for that gives rise to an ideal self. Noddings rejected universal principles for prescribed action and judgment, arguing that care must always be contextually applied. The former stage refers to actual hands-on application of caring services, and the latter to a state of being whereby one nurtures caring ideas or intentions.

She further argued that the scope of caring obligation is limited. The caring obligation is conceived of as moving outward in concentric circles so enlarged care is increasingly characterized by a diminished ability for particularity and contextual judgment, which prompted Noddings to speculate that it is impossible to care-for everyone.

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She maintained that while the one-caring has an obligation to care-for proximate humans and animals to the extent that they are needy and able to respond to offerings of care, there is a lesser obligation to care for distant others if there is no hope that care will be completed. These claims proved to be highly controversial, and Noddings later revised them somewhat. In her more recent book Starting From Home , Noddings endorsed a stronger obligation to care about distant humans, and affirms caring-about as an important motivational stage for inspiring local and global justice, but continued to hold that it is impossible to care-for all, especially distant others.

See 3a. Baier specially underscores trust, a basic relation between particular persons, as the fundamental concept of morality, and notes its obfuscation within theories premised on abstract and autonomous agents. She recommends carving out room for the development of moral emotions and harmonizing the ideals of care and justice. Virginia Held is the editor and author of many books pertaining to care ethics. In much of her work she seeks to move beyond ideals of liberal justice, arguing that they are not as much flawed as limited, and examines how social relations might be different when modeled after mothering persons and children.

Premised on a fundamental non-contractual human need for care, Held construes care as the most basic moral value. She describes feminist ethics as committed to actual experience, with an emphasis on reason and emotion, literal rather than hypothetical persons, embodiment, actual dialogue, and contextual, lived methodologies. In The Ethics of Care , Held demonstrates the relevance of care ethics to political, social and global questions.

Conceptualizing care as a cluster of practices and values, she describes a caring person as one who has appropriate motivations to care for others and who participates adeptly in effective caring practices. She argues for limiting both market provisions for care and the need for legalistic thinking in ethics, asserting that care ethics has superior resources for dealing with the power and violence that imbues all relations, including those on the global level. Specifically, she recommends a view of a globally interdependent civil society increasingly dependent upon an array of caring NGOs for solving problems.

Ultimately, she argues that rights based moral theories presume a background of social connection, and that when fore-grounded, care ethics can help to create communities that promote healthy social relations, rather than the near boundless pursuit of self-interest. Eva Feder Kittay is another prominent care ethicist. Meyers, is one the most significant anthologies in care ethics to date. In Love's Labor , Kittay develops a dependency based account of equality rooted in the activity of caring for the seriously disabled.

She argues that equality for dependency workers and the unavoidably dependent will only be achieved through conceptual and institutional reform. She more precisely calls for the public provision of Doulas , paid professional care-workers who care for care-givers, and uses the principle of Doula to justify welfare for all care-givers, akin to worker's compensation or unemployment benefits.

In this article, and in her later book of the same title , Ruddick uses care ethical methodology to theorize from the lived experience of mothering, rendering a unique approach to moral reasoning and a ground for a feminist politics of peace. Ruddick's analysis, which forges strong associations between care ethics and motherhood, has been both well-received and controversial see Section 6, below.

Joan Tronto is most known for exploring the intersections of care ethics, feminist theory, and political science. She sanctions a feminist care ethic designed to thwart the accretion of power to the existing powerful, and to increase value for activities that legitimize shared power. She identifies moral boundaries that have served to privatize the implications of care ethics, and highlights the political dynamics of care relations which describe, for example, the tendency of women and other minorities to perform care work in ways that benefit the social elite.


See Sections 2 and 8 below. Because it depends upon contextual considerations, care is notoriously difficult to define. As Ruddick points out, at least three distinct but overlapping meanings of care have emerged in recent decades—an ethic defined in opposition to justice, a kind of labor, and a particular relationship , 4.

However, in care ethical literature, 'care' is most often defined as a practice, value, disposition, or virtue, and is frequently portrayed as an overlapping set of concepts. This definition posits care fundamentally as a practice, but Tronto further identifies four sub-elements of care that can be understood simultaneously as stages, virtuous dispositions, or goals.

These sub-elements are: 1 attentiveness, a proclivity to become aware of need; 2 responsibility, a willingness to respond and take care of need; 3 competence, the skill of providing good and successful care; and 4 responsiveness, consideration of the position of others as they see it and recognition of the potential for abuse in care , Tronto's definition is praised for how it admits to cultural variation and extends care beyond family and domestic spheres, but it is also criticized for being overly broad, counting nearly every human activity as care.

Other definitions of care provide more precise delineations. Diemut Bubeck narrows the definitional scope of care by emphasizing personal interaction and dependency. She also holds that one cannot care for oneself, and that care does not require any emotional attachment. While some care ethicists accept that care need not always have an emotional component, Bubeck's definitional exclusion of self-care is rejected by other care ethicists who stress additional aspects of care.

For example, both Maurice Hamington and Daniel Engster make room for self-care in their definitions of care, but focus more precisely on special bodily features and end goals of care Hamington, ; Engster, Although these definitions emphasize care as a practice, not all moral theorists maintain this view of. Alternatively, care is understood as a virtue or motive.

James Rachels, Raja Halwani, and Margaret McLaren have argued for categorizing care ethics as a species of virtue ethics, with care as a central virtue Rachels, ; McLaren, ; Halwani, Some ethicists prefer to understand care as a practice more fundamental than a virtue or motive because doing so resists the tendency to romanticize care as a sentiment or dispositional trait, and reveals the breadth of caring activities as globally intertwined with virtually all aspects of life.

A number of criticisms have been launched against care ethics, including that it is: a a slave morality; b empirically flawed; c theoretically indistinct; d parochial, e essentialist, and f ambiguous. One of the earliest objections was that care ethics is a kind of slave morality valorizing the oppression of women Puka, ; Card, ; Davion, The concept of slave morality comes from the philosopher Frederick Nietzsche, who held that oppressed peoples tend to develop moral theories that reaffirm subservient traits as virtues.

Following this tradition, the charge that care ethics is a slave morality interprets the different voice of care as emerging from patriarchal traditions characterized by rigidly enforced sexual divisions of labor. This critique issues caution against uncritically valorizing caring practices and inclinations because women who predominantly perform the work of care often do so to their own economic and political disadvantage. To the extent that care ethics encourages care without further inquiring as to who is caring for whom, and whether these relationships are just, it provides an unsatisfactory base for a fully libratory ethic.

This objection further implies that the voice of care may not be an authentic or empowering expression, but a product of false consciousness that equates moral maturity with self-sacrifice and self-effacement.

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Gilligan has been faulted for basing her conclusions on too narrow a sample, and for drawing from overly homogenous groups such as students at elite colleges and women considering abortion thereby excluding women who would not view abortion as morally permissible. For instance, Vanessa Siddle Walker and John Snarey surmise that resolution of the Heinz dilemma shifts if Heinz is identified as Black, because in the United States African-American males are disproportionately likely to be arrested for crime, and less likely to have their cases dismissed without stringent penalties Walker and Snarey, Sandra Harding observes certain similarities between care ethics and African moralities, noting that care ethics has affinities with many other moral traditions Harding, Sarah Lucia Hoagland identifies care as the heart of lesbian connection, but also cautions against the dangers of assuming that all care relations are ideally maternalistic Hoagland, Thus, even if some women identify with care ethics, it is unclear whether this is a general quality of women, whether moral development is distinctly and dualistically gendered, and whether the voice of care is the only alternative moral voice.

However, authors like Marilyn Friedman maintain that even if it cannot be shown that care is a distinctly female moral orientation, it is plausibly understood as a symbolically feminine approach Friedman, Along similar lines some critics object that care ethics is not a highly distinct moral theory, and that it rightly incorporates liberal concepts such as autonomy, equality, and justice. Some defenders of utilitarianism and deontology argue that the concerns highlighted by care ethics have been, or could be, readily addressed by existing theories Nagl-Docekal, ; Ma, Others suggest that care ethics merely reduces to virtue ethics with care being one of many virtues Rachels, ; Slote, a; b; McLaren, , Halwani, Although a number of care ethicists explore the possible overlap between care ethics and other moral theories, the distinctiveness of the ethic is defended by some current advocates of care ethics, who contend that the focus on social power, identity, relationship, and interdependency are unique aspects of the theory Sander-Staudt, Most care ethicists make room for justice concerns and for critically scrutinizing alternatives amongst justice perspectives.

In some cases, care ethicists understand the perspectives of care and justice as mutual supplements to one another. Other theorists underscore the strategic potential for construing care as a right in liberal societies that place a high rhetorical value on human rights. Yet others explore the benefits of integrating care ethics with less liberal traditions of justice, such as Marxism Bubeck, Another set of criticisms center around the concern that care ethics obscures larger social dynamics and is overly parochial.

Critics worry that this stance privileges elite care-givers by excusing them from attending to significant differences in international standards of living and their causes. Noddings now affirms an explicit theme of justice in care ethics that resists arbitrary favoritism, and that extends to public and international domains. Other care ethicists refine Noddings' claim by emphasizing the practical and moral connections between proximate and distant relations, by affirming a principle of care for the most vulnerable on a global level, and by explicitly weaving a political component into care theory.

The objection that care ethics is essentialist stems from the more general essentialist critique made by Elizabeth Spelman Following this argument, early versions of care ethics have been faulted for failing to explore the ways in which women and others differ from one another, and for thereby offering a uniform picture of moral development that reinforces sex stereotypes Tronto, Critics challenge tendencies in care ethics to theorize care based on a dyadic model of a care-giving mother and a care-receiving child, on the grounds that it overly romanticizes motherhood and does not adequately represent the vast experiences of individuals Hoagland, The charge of essentialism in care ethics highlights ways in which women and men are differently implicated in chains of care depending on variables of class, race, age, and more.

Essentialism in care ethics is problematic not only because it is conceptually facile, but also because of its political implications for social justice. For example, in the United States women of color and white women are differently situated in terms of who is more likely to give and receive care, and of what degree and quality, because the least paid care workers predominantly continue to be women of color. Likewise, lesbian and heterosexual women are differently situated in being able to claim the benefits and burdens of marriage, and are not equally presumed to be fit as care-givers.

Contemporary feminist care ethicists attempt to avoid essentialism by employing several strategies, including: more thoroughly illuminating the practices of care on multiple levels and from various perspectives; situating caring practices in place and time; construing care as the symbolic rather than actual voice of women; exploring the potential of care as a gender neutral activity; and being consistently mindful of perspective and privilege in the activity of moral theorizing.

Because it eschews abstract principles and decisional procedures, care ethics is often accused of being unduly ambiguous, and for failing to offer concrete guidance for ethical action Rachels, Some care ethicists find the non-principled nature of care ethics to be overstated, noting that because a care perspective may eschew some principles does not mean that it eschews all principles entirely Held, Principles that could be regarded as central to care ethics might pertain to the origin and basic need of care relations, the evaluation of claims of need, the obligation to care, and the scope of care distribution.

On principle, it would seem, a care ethic guides the moral agent to recognize relational interdependency, care for the self and others, cultivate the skills of attention, response, respect, and completion, and maintain just and caring relationships. However, while theorists define care ethics as a theory derived from actual practices, they simultaneously resist subjectivism and moral relativism. Because of its association with women, care ethics is often construed as a feminine ethic.

Indeed, care ethics, feminine ethics, and feminist ethics are often treated as synonymous. But although they overlap, these are discrete fields in that although care ethics connotes feminine traits, not all feminine and feminist ethics are care ethics, and the necessary connection between care ethics and femininity has been subject to rigorous challenge. The idea that there may be a distinctly woman-oriented, or a feminine approach to ethics, can be traced far back in history. Attempts to legitimate this approach gained momentum in the 18 th and 19 th centuries, fueled by some suffragettes, who argued that granting voting rights to white women would lead to moral social improvements.

Central assumptions of feminine ethics are that women are similar enough to share a common perspective, rooted in the biological capacity and expectation of motherhood, and that characteristically feminine traits include compassion, empathy, nurturance, and kindness. But once it is acknowledged that women are diverse, and that some men exhibit equally strong tendencies to care, it is not readily apparent that care ethics is solely or uniquely feminine.

Many women, in actuality and in myth, in both contemporary and past times, do not exhibit care. Other factors of social identity, such as ethnicity and class, have also been found to correlate with care thinking.

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Nonetheless, care has pervasively been assumed to be a symbolically feminine trait and perspective, and many women resonate with a care perspective. What differentiates feminine and feminist care ethics turns on the extent to which there is critical inquiry into the empirical and symbolic association between women and care, and concern for the power-related implications of this association.

Alison Jaggar characterizes a feminist ethic as one which exposes masculine and other biases in moral theory, understands individual actions in the context of social practices, illuminates differences between women, provides guidance for private, public, and international issues, and treats the experiences of women respectfully, but not uncritically Jaggar, Slote develops a strictly gender neutral theory of care on the grounds that care ethics can be traced to the work of male as well as female philosophers.

Although he acknowledges that women are disadvantaged in current caring distributions and are often socialized to value self-effacing care, his theory is feminist only in seeking to assure that the basic needs of women and girls are met and their capabilities developed. While cautious of the associations between care and femininity, they find it useful to tap the resources of the lived and embodied experiences of women, a common one which is the capacity to birth children. They tend to define care as a practice partially in order to stay mindful of the ongoing empirical if misguided associations between care and women, that must inform utopian visions of care as a gender-neutral activity and virtue.

Complicating things further, individuals who are sexed as women may nonetheless gain social privilege when they exhibit certain perceived traits of the male gender, such as being unencumbered and competitive, suggesting that it is potentially as important to revalue feminine traits and activities, as it is to stress the gender-neutral potential of care ethics.

As it currently stands, care ethicists agree that women are positioned differently than men in relation to caring practices, but there is no clear consensus about the best way to theorize sex and gender in care ethics. The most pre-dominant of these comparisons has been between care ethics and virtue ethics, to the extent that care ethics is sometimes categorized as a form of virtue ethics, with care being a central virtue. The identification of caring virtues fuels the tendency to classify care ethics as a virtue ethic, although this system of classification is not universally endorsed.

Some theorists move to integrate care and virtue ethics for strategic reasons. Caring : Gender-sensitive Ethics. Peta Bowden. In Caring, Peta Bowden extends and challenges recent debates on feminist ethics. It also gives rise to new relationships between women, and its rules ensure that these 34 relationships will be based on a mutual sense of recognition. As Comerford and Fambrough argue,?

Comerford and Fambrough , Thus, if consciousness-raising invites women to work on themselves in order to change both their personal and their social condition, these new relationships also provide a basis for socio-political transformation. Because it links women? Hence, consciousness-raising links ethics and politics because it invites both personal and social transformation.

As women become aware of the global structures of oppression that affects their lives, they become empowered, gain a new self-confidence, and work on themselves in order to resist domination in their individual lives. By increasing their own freedom, individual women also increase collective freedom. At the same time, the new connections and the awareness of a commonality between women?

There is thus an intrinsic link between personal and social transformation, or between the ethical work on oneself and the increasing of everyone? This link between personal and social transformation fits well with Gilligan? Indeed, according to her,? Gilligan , 11; Consciousness-raising, by linking the personal to the political as well as ethical work on oneself to social transformation, provides a good way to make women?

Hence, as a practice of the self, consciousness-raising is a key in transforming 35 women? If women stop silencing themselves and internalizing norms of femininity and, through consciousness-raising, make their voices about the importance of care for human life heard, they can possibly transform the patriarchal system, increase their freedom, and advance gender equality. The fact that McLaren only talks about women groups when she describes consciousness-raising is problematic because these groups are now?

As Sowards and Renegar have demonstrated, however, methods of consciousness-raising have substantially evolved since the s. Under third-wave feminism, which they define as? These new challenges, which include? Accordingly, under contemporary feminism, new methods of consciousness-raising include the diffusion of personal stories in? Thus, third-wave consciousness-raising doesn? It also resolves the main limitation of the second-wave method, because these methods are based on both the assumptions of commonality and diversity between women. Indeed, it is easier to present diversity when consciousness-raising occurs through the diffusion of stories, in classrooms or in culture, than when it occurs in small homogenous groups of women.

Finally, since they still link women? They are still ways for women to individually work on themselves in order to resist domination. Consciousness-raising through classrooms also has the same potential for creating relationships between feminists as it does through women? In this final section, I will suggest some concrete measures that could result from a? These are measures that women could claim and require in order to make their social conditions consequent with their knowledge of the importance of care for human life. Since the works of feminist thinkers are an important part of today?

Developing an understanding of gender sensitive care: exploring concepts and knowledge

Of course, consciousness-raising is an open process and these suggestions by philosophers are opened to discussion and changes according to women? They are only suggestions. A consciousness-raising process based on care would be a process? This can be done readily through two of the methods of third-wave feminism consciousness-raising, that is, the diffusion of personal stories and women?

In this process, the works of feminist thinkers can be a good basis for guiding our thinking regarding questions related to care. According to these works, the goal of a consciousness-raising based on care would be to release women from their confinement to roles of care, to? Sevenhuijsen , If they stop silencing themselves and start claiming the importance of care, women would, according to the literature on the ethic of care, most likely come to the following conclusion: because care is fundamental for human life, it needs to be both valorized and redistributed.

The first step for gender equality, then, is the valorization of care work, or the? Williams , Indeed, what we need are norms and policies that? As Kittay claims, we need to give care? Kittay , We thus need to grant this standing to informal care work, and to enhance currently paid care 38 work. The second step is the redistribution of care work. According to Nancy Fraser, this has to be done through the deconstruction of gender roles Fraser , First, the?

We need to? Second, formal care work should also be redistributed so that it ceases to be considered largely or exclusively? The goal behind this advocacy for a redistribution of care work is to? This would be a major step toward gender equality: for some feminists,? Hankivsky , For some feminists, including Ariel Levy and Carol Gilligan herself, the? For Levy and Gilligan, gender equality cannot exist within the structure of the so-called traditional family:? Many solutions can be advanced, but it is clear that inducing women to work while continuing to provide the majority of child care is not one of them.

Within the two general orientations of valorization and redistribution of care work, then, what concrete measures could women come to claim through consciousness-raising?

Ethics of Care

I will only give a brief suggestion of what this political project could look like, because the concrete measures have to be decided by women collectively. Regarding valorization, many feminists argue that care work has to be recognized as having the same value as any other work in our society. This implies two things: first, informal care work has to be recognized as work, and second, formal care work has to have the same value as other kinds of work. For Kittay, care work? Concretely, this means that informal care work such as child care, elder care, etc.

Kittay advocates? This advocacy derives from the fact that care, when taken out of the house and provided by other people or institutions, has to be paid for. The second measure regarding the valorization of care work is that, not only does it have to be paid, but it also has to be given the same value as other types of work. This is necessary in order to erase the inequalities between care workers and other workers.

Since care work is for the moment deeply gendered, its valorization and an adequate financial compensation would be a first step toward gender equality. Women could come to this realization through 40 consciousness-raising, and they could claim these measures, for instance through the launching of a public debate, in order to change the conditions that contribute to their domination. Regarding the objective of redistribution, which is fundamental for gender equality, care work must necessarily be?

For the question of gender, this means two things. First, the part of care work that needs training nurse, elementary school teacher, etc. Second, the care work that is provided within the family also has to be? As Fraser claims, gender equality requires that we? Fraser , This would ensure both that caring becomes shared, and that employers recognize the entitlement [or more precisely, the obligation] of fathers to engage in caring activities?

Other concrete measures include the restructuring of the work place and work culture in order to accommodate both men and women in their caring responsibilities. This means introducing flexible working hours, a shorter full-time week, a right to part-time work, the attribution of social security advantages to everybody that contributes to caring work, the right to take a paid or unpaid leave for caring for others without loss of job, etc.

The redistribution of care work also means that we have to rethink the distribution of this work between the family, the market, civil society, and the state Fraser , If we acknowledge that all citizens can be caregiver and worker, then we also acknowledge that women should not be seen as 41 responsible for all care work and that new social arrangements have to be found in order to accommodate the human need for care.

In sum, the redistribution of care work is a fundamental step for gender equality, and that is why women should start to think of ways through which this redistribution can be done in order to increase their freedom and gender equality. The concrete measures that I have suggested here are only indications of what a political project of resistance following from a consciousness-raising based on care could look like. They are examples of what women could start to claim if they stop silencing themselves, if they express their voices and if they act on themselves in order to change the social conditions that contribute to their domination.

Consciousness-raising could help them realize that the devaluation of care work is a factor that maintains them in a state of inferiority and, as a practice of freedom, it could lead them to see what concrete measures would increase their freedom and lead to the construction of a world where there is less domination and more gender equality. As a political project of resistance against gender inequality, I have then suggested consciousness-raising as a practice of freedom that could make women step back from their reality, analyze it, and see how it could be changed in order to increase their freedom.

If women could start a process of consciousness-raising based on care, through women? By analyzing how current conditions related to care contribute to their domination, and how they could be changed in order to increase their freedom, women could come up with some concrete measures that would eradicate gender inequalities. Of course, there are many possible obstacles to this outcome in the current cultural landscape, like the social devaluing of feminism and the fact that men have generally been reluctant in taking more responsibilities related to care.

That is why men would probably need consciousness-raising too, and women would have to find ways to convince them to accept their measures for gender equality. This is the only way to achieve more equal freedom for both men and women. If the measures presented in this essay based on the work of care ethic philosophers 43 are relevant suggestions, it is in the end necessary for women to decide the concrete content of their political project themselves.

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